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THE ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS,
U. S. MARINE CORPS

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THE ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS

By

Leo Joseph Scolforo, Jr.

Bachelor of Science

College of the Holy Cross, 1955

A Thesis Submitted to the School of Government,
Business and International Affairs of the George
Washington University in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Business Administration

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Thesis directed by

Karl Ernest Stromsem, Ph. D.

Professor of Public Administration

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis began as a study of the relationship of planning and programming to budgeting within the Marine Corps. The fantastic complexity of organizational inter-relationships encountered early in this study diverted my attention to the basic question of the organizational structure of Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. I am greatly indebted to Kenneth W. Condit and Major John H. Johnstone, USMC for the information and sources which they provided in Marine Corps Historical Reference Series, Number 25, "A Brief History of Marine Corps Staff Organization."

A good part of this thesis is devoted to the impact of information technology. One cannot help but be impressed with this problem when the current total organization is viewed. There is a pressing practical need for better information systems because of the profound implications that these systems have in the defense environment of today.

One cannot study organizations without coming to realize the tremendous importance that individuals have on their structure and functioning. This is especially true of a relatively small organization such as the Headquarters, Marine Corps. The effects of the actions and beliefs of two such individuals during a critical era are portrayed in Chapter II. Many other instances of the impact of individuals became apparent in the course of the study. Such factors led to the most significant lesson I learned while working on this thesis: organizational structures, both

formal and informal, are as much determined by human emotions as by reason.

CHAPTER I

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS ORGANIZATION, 1798 TO PRESENT

The Early Staff

The Headquarters of the U. S. Marine Corps was managed by a small administrative staff from its inception in 1798 until the early twentieth century. The Act of 11 July 1798 established the Marine Corps as a permanent organization and provided authorization for a staff as follows: "If the Marine Corps, or any part of it, shall be ordered by the President to do duty on shore, and it shall become necessary to appoint an adjutant, paymaster, quartermaster . . . the major or commandant of the corps is hereby authorized to appoint such officer or officers. . . ."¹

The first commandant interpreted this liberally and soon appointed an adjutant, quartermaster, and a paymaster to serve as his staff. He didn't need more than this because:

the Marine Corps created in 1798 was built upon and around the framework of individual ship detachments authorized under previous naval legislation- there were some 25 officers and 58 enlisted men already on the rolls as "Marines" before the Marine Corps was created. Prime concerns of Burrows [the first Commandant] and his staff were recruiting to the authorized strength and outfitting and disciplining the farflung ship detachments.²

¹U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. I, p. 594.

²Kenneth W. Condit and Major John H. Johnstone, USMC, A Brief History of Marine Corps Staff Organization, Marine Corps Historical Reference Series, Number 25 (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1963), p. 2.

The function the paymaster served is self-explanatory.

The quartermaster designation was inherited from the Continental Army which in turn had derived it from the British military system. While a British quartermaster had both supply and operational responsibility, our Congress enacted legislation stressing the supply aspects for quartermasters which restricted them essentially to that function.

In British staffs the adjutants were usually the dominant staff officers of the various command echelons. "They not only controlled the personnel administration of the units, but much of their prestige was attributable to the fact that they were the staff officers through which most of the general orders were issued."¹ The double status of Adjutant-Inspector found in the Marine Corps can be traced to the combination of these duties found in Army legislation of 1796. One of the members of the General Staff of the Army was an inspector, to do duty as adjutant general.²

This basic Marine Corps staff, consisting of quartermaster, paymaster and adjutant-inspector, continued to exist for a century and a quarter. During the nineteenth century the staff was manned by administrative specialists who were somewhat divorced from line duties. In 1847 Congress passed an act separating the commissions of the Marine Corps into line and staff.³ The Secretary of the

¹J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff (Harrisburg, Penn.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1944), p. 155.

²Ibid., p. 158.

³U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. 9, p. 154.



Navy had urged the establishment of staff commissions in a letter to the Chairman of the Committee of Naval Affairs as follows:

. . . Under existing laws the duties of the Staff of the Marine Corps are not only incompatible with lineal commission rank, but cannot exist separately. From the experience of a similar change in the Army, I do not perceive any just objection to the modification proposed, by which the officers of the Marine Corps, appointed to Staff duty, may be required to hold one or the other but not both.¹

This concept of line-staff incompatibility divided the officer corps into administrators and fighters.

The military art, according to this view, consisted of training troops and leading them in combat. The quartermaster, paymaster and adjutants and inspectors, on the other hand, were concerned only with administrative matters beyond the understanding of the troop-leading line officer.²

The staff of administrators that managed the Headquarters of the Marine Corps during this era was not large.

A staff of from three to five officers, whose sole concern was with routine administration . . . was all that was required by the tiny Marine Corps of the 19th century. Peak strength before the Spanish-American War was only 3,860, achieved in 1865. And in a period when the national military policy provided for wars to be fought by improvised armies of hastily raised volunteers with little or no prior preparation, a planning staff at Headquarters was not needed.³

The Twentieth Century brought the Marine Corps into a new era of expansion and growth.

The emergence of the United States as a world power after

¹Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, dated 20 Jan 1847.

²Condit and Johnstone, p. 4.

³Ibid., p. 5.

the Spanish-American War extended national interests over many areas of the globe, giving rise to a greatly expanded employment of Marines. Beginning in 1900, hardly a year passed without Marine forces intervening to support national policy in some foreign country. . . . The new steam-powered navy needed bases for coaling and repairs, and, as the United States did not own enough suitable locations for these facilities, seizure and defense of advance naval bases became necessary. The Marine Corps . . . was a natural for this type of operation.¹

The change this induced at Headquarters was largely one of expanding the three staff departments. There was, in addition, the rise of the immediate "Office of the Commandant," a phrase by which all staff activities outside the three departments became known. In 1902 an aide-de-camp to the Commandant was assigned. This was followed in 1911 by the appointment of an Assistant to the Commandant. Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, the second officer to hold this office, described its duties as being

to assist the Commandant in coordinating the various activities at Headquarters, especially with reference to matters pertaining to military training, military education, and equipment of troops, with their organization, distribution, and assembly at embarkation points for expeditionary duty. . . . In other words an Executive Officer, or Chief of Staff, had become necessary.²

The Detail System for Filling Staff Billets

Just prior to World War I the Marine Corps reevaluated its stand on the separation of line and staff. This led to the adoption of the detail system that is an important aspect of Marine Corps staff functioning today. In 1913 the Commandant stated his view as follows:

¹Ibid., p. 5-6.

²Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1930), p. 219.

The duties assigned the Adjutant and Inspector's Department are so closely related to line duties that thoroughly satisfactory performance of these duties can only be gained by service with troops. Officers of this department are properly assignable as brigade adjutants; they are required to inspect troops both in the garrison and in the field, and these duties require technical knowledge that can only be gained by actual experience, and as with time conditions and methods change, it is almost impossible for a permanent staff officer to keep himself informed of changing conditions.¹

In his report to the Secretary of the Navy in 1915 the Commandant wrote:

The detail system in the staff departments of the Army has demonstrated its superiority over the former system of permanent appointments. The present Army system provides that all vacancies occurring in the staff departments shall be filled by promoting the permanent staff officers of the respective departments as formerly required by law, and that vacancies thus created at the foot of the lists of such departments shall be filled by the detail of line officers of corresponding grades for a period of four years. The arguments in favor of this system are, in my opinion, unanswerable, and its adoption by the Marine Corps is therefore recommended.²

One of the factors involved in the Army's adoption of the detail process was the desire of the Secretary of War to break up the power centers that had arisen under the bureau system.³ Detailing line officers to staff billets tended to halt the process of self perpetuation that had long been practiced by the officer corps within each bureau.

¹U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings on the Personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps, (Washington: 1914), pp. 740-741.

²U.S., Department of the Navy, Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1915 (Washington: 1916), p. 759.

³Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 16.

While members of the Marine Corps today are accustomed to thinking of the Commandant as the sole commander of the Marine Corps, it has not always been so. Earlier in this century the Headquarters was run by a triumvirate- the Commandant and his immediate office, the Quartermaster and the Adjutant and Inspector.¹ Each had his own separate statutory existence and powers. Each also had his own group of personnel and promotional system. As late as 1951 the Organizational Manual, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps attested to this triangular division as follows:

The Headquarters organization is composed of the offices of the Commandant, (including the Administrative Division, the Division of Plans and Policies, the Division of Public Information, the Division of Aviation, the Inspection Division, the Division of Reserve, the Division of Recruiting, the Historical Division and the Director of Women Marines) and the Supply Department and the Personnel Department. (Italics mine.)²

That considerable friction existed between these groups is suggested by Brig. Gen. Rufus H. Lane:

The duties of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department in the Marine Corps are primarily those of administration. It would be an interesting study to inquire into the genesis of the division of duties at our Headquarters. No doubt the present duties of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department have been considerably curtailed, due to a certain unpopularity of the Department. . . . And also to the hostility between the Adjutant and Inspector and the Commandant, which appears to have extended intermittently over considerable periods. There is reason to believe that at certain stages the only communication between the Commandant and the Adjutant and

65. ¹Interview with Lt. Gen. G. C. Thomas, USMC(Ret), 28 Jan

²Organization Manual, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1 Dec. 1951, Part II, p. 1.

Inspector was by the written word only: No doubt the very long terms of office in a permanent status of Adjutants and Inspectors have contributed to this result. (Italics mine.)¹

Whatever the reasons, on August 29, 1916 a law was enacted as follows:

No further permanent appointments shall be made in any grade in any staff department. Any vacancy hereafter occurring in the lower grade of any staff department shall be filled by the detail of an officer of the line for a period of four years unless sooner relieved;
... 2

Since that time the Marine Corps has adhered to the theory that the duties of all staff departments are military in nature and that officers should be experienced in both staff and line duties.

Organizational Implications of World War I

The advent of American participation in World War I brought a new role to the Marine Corps and new challenge for its management.

The unanticipated involvement of the Marine Corps in the land warfare of World War I proved a turning point in its staff concepts. The Marine Corps expanded from 13,725 to 75,100 personnel, sent four regiments to France, maintained an advance base force in the Caribbean, and furnished security detachments and sea-going Marines for the Navy. There was a need felt to replace the old administrative staff that had been adequate for the expeditionary forces operating in Latin America and in previous wars. The staff system developed by American Expeditionary Forces in World War I provided the model for a new staff organization in the Marine Corps for the conditions of modern war.³

¹Brig. Gen. Rufus H. Lane, USMC, "The Adjutant and Inspector's Department," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. XVII, No. 2, (Aug. 1932), p. 31.

²U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. 39, p. 610.

³Condit and Johnstone, p. 8.

The Commanding General of the AEF studied the British and French Army staffs that had developed after three years of combat. He adopted a staff organization modeled after that of the French. This consisted of a general staff organized along functional lines. This was assisted by a special staff of technical and administrative officers who helped in carrying out its plans. This general staff was organized according to level as follows;¹

<u>AEF Staff</u> (5 Sections)	<u>Field Armies</u> (4 Sections)	<u>Corps and Divisions</u> (3 Sections)
G-1 Personnel	Same as AEF Staff,	Same as Field
G-2 Intelligence	except G-5 was omit-	Armies, except
G-3 Operations	ted. The Training	G-4 was omitted
G-4 Supply	Function was put	and the supply
G-5 Training	with operations.	function was put
		under Personnel

Marines serving with the AEF became familiar with this organization from using it in the organization of Marine brigades and from duty on AEF staffs. They applied it to field commands soon after but more than thirty years elapsed before a general staff was installed at Headquarters.

The Period from World War I to 1941

After World War I a larger scale staff system was introduced into Headquarters, Marine Corps. The inadequacy of the planning encountered in World War I led to the establishment of the Planning Section in 1918. This section was in the Office of the Commandant and under the direct supervision of the Assistant to the Commandant. Within two years, the Planning Section had

¹Condit and Johnstone, p. 10.



grown into the Division of Operations and Training composed of five sections: Operations, Training, Military Education, Military Intelligence, and Aviation. This expansion came about because

. . . while the administrative staff departments had brought their methods of handling purely administrative matters to a very high and excellent state of efficiency, the need was felt for an organization or office at Headquarters of the Marine Corps to give more studied attention to questions which are distinctly military in their nature, such as organization of units, matters of training, choice of most suitable arms and equipment, military schooling etc.¹

In describing the operation of this division, General Feland went on to say: " . . . its functions are similar to those of the General Staff of the Army in handling such questions and similar to those followed in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in handling Naval matters."²

In 1920 the Commandant established the Personnel, Recruiting and Educational sections. The Personnel Section handled officer procurement and detailing of officers and men. The Recruiting Sections took charge of enlisted recruiting. The Education Section took charge of all non-military education. The resulting organizational chart, as of 1 December 1920, is shown in Figure 1 on page 12.

Between 1920 and 1941 the following organizational changes occurred:³

¹Brigadier General Logan Feland, USMC, "The Division of Operations and Training, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. VII, (March, 1922), p. 41.

²Ibid., p. 43.

³Condit and Johnstone, pp. 11-17.




FIGURE 1.

----- Special cognizance

Source: Condit and Johnstone, p. 12.



1. A Publicity Section was established in the Adjutant and Inspector's Department. This was expanded into the Division of Public Relations in 1941.

2. The Reserve Act of 1929 led to the consolidation of reserve functions into the Reserve Section. This became the Division of Reserve in 1937.


3. The Aviation Section was removed from the Division of Operations and Training and established as an independent division in 1935.

4. The Personnel Section became a division and absorbed the Recruiting Section in 1937.

5. A War Plans Section was created in the Division of Operations and Training to ensure effective participation by the Marine Corps in Army and Navy war planning. This section was abolished in late 1941, its functions being absorbed by the M-3 section.

6. The Division of Operations and Training was redesignated the Division of Plans and Policies in 1939. An "M" numbering system was developed for its sections. As can be seen in the organizational chart shown in Figure 2, on page 14, a distinction is made between this planning staff and the various administrative, technical, supply and operating departments and divisions. The policy and planning staff recommended what actions should be taken, but did not coordinate or supervise the administrative staff in its execution of the resulting orders of the Commandant.

World War II



Source: Condit and Johnstone, p. 17.

FIGURE 2.

As Headquarters expanded to meet the demands of World War II the organization proved basically sound. Some adjustments were required. The more significant changes during 1941 to 1944 were as follows:

1. The call-up of the reserves left the Division of Reserve with little to do. It took over the task of Officer Procurement.

2. Personnel administration duties were split between the Adjutant and Inspector's Department and the Division of Reserve and Personnel. A management engineering study resulted in the organization of the Personnel Department in 1943, to consolidate all personnel administrative functions.¹ This department absorbed the Adjutant and Inspector's Department, and the Divisions of Personnel and Reserve.

3. This same study resulted in the establishment of the Administrative Division in 1943. Prior to this each division handled its own office services. All housekeeping functions and personnel were put under this division.

4. In accordance with a Navy Department directive, the Marine Corps was required to establish a Fiscal Director. The Commandant assigned this task to the Quartermaster General as an additional duty.²

¹Memorandum from the Management Engineer, Navy Department to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Survey of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, dated 28 July 1943.

²Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and Policies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Reorganization of Headquarters, Marine Corps, undated.

The organization that had developed by 1944 was similar to what it had been in 1941. It is shown in Figure 3, on page 17.

In 1945 the training section of the Division of Plans and Policies was absorbed by the operations section. That same year the Inspection Division headed by the Inspector General was established. With these last two changes the Marine Corps came to the end of World War II.

Post World War II

The end of the War was followed by a series of organizational changes. Among the more significant of these were the following:¹

1. With the end of the war the buildup of the Reserves was again important. The Division of Reserve was separated from the Personnel Department in 1946.

2. Within the Plans and Policies Division a Strategic Plans Section was created to fill a new need as noted by the Director:

The workload of this division has recently been increased through the development of plans and studies required by this Headquarters and the Navy Department. These assignments have become more frequent in view of unstable world affairs. Their scope and the detail required was not originally contemplated in the post-war organization of this division. . . . This section will of necessity function in close conjunction with the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-03M) and other sections of this division .²

¹Condit and Johnstone, pp. 23-24.

²Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and Policies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Strategic Planning Section, Division of Plans and Policies; Establishment of., dated 12 Sept. 47.




FIGURE 3.



It's origin and mission was closely analogous to that of the War Plans Section described in the years after World War I.

3. The Quartermaster and Paymaster Departments were merged to form the Supply Department in 1946. Proposals for such a merger had been made as far back as 1932. This merger was the only one the Marine Corps made under the provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1945.¹ This same year the Marine Corps was authorized to create a group of Supply Duty Only (SDO) officers. This provided a group of staff specialists (very similar to the quartermasters) that formed the basic staff for the Supply Department..

4. Contrary to this move towards functional organization, the Recruiting Division was set up independently of the Personnel Department in 1946.

5. The Division of Plans and Policies made a similar break with its traditional organization by creating separate sections for Engineer, Communications and Electronics, Research and Development, Tank, and Amphiban Tractor, and Anti-Mechanized Defense. The reasoning behind the establishment of these sections was that there was a need felt for a section concerned with developing each of the items of special concern to the Marine Corps' amphibious mission.

In summary, the organization of Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps that existed after World War II had evolved gradually over the years. There was a theoretical separation in this organiza-

¹Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and Policies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Recommendation for action under the Reorganization Act of 1945., dated 11 Jan 46.

tion between those who were primarily concerned with planning and making policy and those who executed the policy. The over-all planning and policy-making was the responsibility of the Division of Plans and Policies which had the following stated function:

. . . its mission, as set forth in a report to the Commandant, 6 April 1945, has . . . continued essentially the same:

"The Director of the Division of Plans and Policies formulates Marine Corps policy and develops plans for personnel, intelligence, operations, supply, equipment and training, and maintains liaison regarding these matters with other agencies."¹

This Division was organized functionally along the same general staff lines as Marine Corps units. However, it did not have the normal general staff authority to supervise and coordinate the execution of the policy or plans it developed. The organization chart for 1941 (Figure 2 on page 14) shows the administrative, technical, supply and operating staff that were the agencies who executed approved policies, doctrines and plans. These divisions and departments were independent of the Division of Plans and Policies. They had direct lines of authority and access to the Commandant and his assistant.

The General Staff Issue

Near the end of World War II opposition to this division of duties was expressed. On 30 June 1944 the Director of the Department of Plans and Policies prepared a memorandum for the

¹Administrative History: United States Marine Corps in World War II, (Unpublished manuscript available at Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.), Part 1, dated 10 October 1946, p. 126.

Commandant in which he urged the adoption of a general staff organization for Headquarters.¹ His reasoning is outlined in the following excerpts from this memorandum:

. . . the current organization denies the Commandant, to a large extent, three of the fundamentals of military command, namely:

- (a) Supervision
- (b) Coordination
- (c) Information

These shortcomings will be discussed in order.

Supervision

The Commandant makes decisions from time to time, which are in due course transmitted to one of his executive agencies; the Personnel Department, Paymaster General's Department, Quartermaster General's Department, or the Public Relations Division. After once announcing such a decision, the Commandant has no subordinate agency charged with supervising its execution or determining that his will is in fact being interpreted as he intended. In short, this Headquarters is functioning on the unsound premise that an order issued is an order executed, . . .

Coordination

The present organization of this Headquarters, because of its loosely knit form, results in each of the several departments and divisions having an extremely wide latitude in the delineation, interpretation and execution of its duties. Overlap is frequent and in many cases effort is not well coordinated. . . . On occasion, because of no precise coordination, omissions or conflicting directives occur. . . .

Information

Funds form an important factor in the conduct of the Marine Corps' business, even in time of war. As presently organized, the Office of the Commandant, including his advisory body, is not in possession of the overall monetary picture. . . .

Records concerning personnel are maintained in several of the various departments and divisions. Yet there is no single agency where all personnel information is available.

Statistics form an important index in guiding the Commandant in his decisions. Despite this fact there is no single statistical organization within Marine Corps

¹Memorandum from Director, Division of Plans and Policies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: The Organization of Marine Corps Headquarters, dated 30 June 1944.

Headquarters, with the result that parallel statistics may be found in several elements of the Headquarters.

. . .

That there has been a real and pressing need for a general staff system in this Headquarters may be concluded from an examination of the evolution of the Division of Plans and Policies. By definition, it is a planning and advisory body and has neither administrative nor operating responsibilities. Yet the volume of business which involves the executive function has grown so in the past few years that sheer necessity has resulted in the Division of Plans and Policies gradually accumulating executive functions, as well as many of the characteristics peculiar to a general staff. It is discharging these functions mainly on the basis of cooperation. This mode of operation proves on occasion to be most unsatisfactory, particularly when conclusions of the Division of Plans and Policies find themselves at variance with the conclusions of one of the other operating agencies of the Commandant. The current practice, which is solely an expedient dictated by necessity, falls so far short of the ideal as to be considered unsatisfactory. In consequence, it is considered an essential step to replace the present system with a clearly defined general staff organization which adheres closely to the general staff principle, departing from it in its execution only where necessary to match the peculiarities of the Marine Corps' mission.

Though he did not express it in his memorandum, he also pointed out to the Commandant that there was a need for a chief-of-staff. The assistant Commandant had not been assigned this function and, as a result, operated more like a vice-commandant, than a chief-of-staff.¹

This suggestion was not immediately adopted. The Director reworked the suggestion and resubmitted it in 1945.² This time he included among the reasons for the change a need for more

¹Interview with Lt. Gen. G. C. Thomas, USMC(Ret), 28 Jan 65.

²Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and Policies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Organization of Headquarters, Marine Corps, dated 29 Nov. 1945.

efficient operation and for a closer parallel between Marine Corps Headquarters organization and that found in the War Department and major Marine Corps commands. He reiterated the crux of the problem as given in his earlier memorandum:

Although the proposed organization resembles the present one in many respects, the primary difference in adopting the basic principles of the general staff is that the executive staff sections would have definite responsibilities in regard to supervision of and coordination between the special staff sections of the Headquarters as well as the activities of entire Marine Corps. At present the Division of Plans and Policies has no executive authority, with the result that there is a definite lack of responsibility for supervising and coordinating the execution of general plans which have been prepared and approved. On accepting the principles of the general staff as a basis for reorganization of this Headquarters, it will be possible to coordinate the general plans presently prepared in the Division of Plans and Policies with the necessary detailed planning that must be correlated in the other agencies to execute the general plans. No established procedure for this coordination exists at present, except through informal liaison and cooperation or by referring each controversial detail to the Commandant for decision. (*Italics mine.*)

This proposal was also disapproved by the Commandant. However, the seed had been sown, and it was not long before there was fruit on the vine.

In 1948 reorganization was again proposed, this time by the report of a special board.¹ The reorganization would have been along the lines of the proposals of 1944 and 1945, except that the Division of Plans and Policies sections would have been entitled the Directorates of Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Training, and Logistics. This proposal, very similar to the Army organization evolving at that time, failed to be adopted.

¹Condit and Johnstone, p. 25.

Division of Plans and Policies Study 23-49

Implementation of a General Staff was urged again in 1949.

Once more its champion was the Director of the Plans and Policies Division.¹ The need for better supervision and coordination within the Headquarters continued to be felt. The reasoning produced by the study conducted in 1949 was as follows:

Personnel stringencies require that each organization within the Marine Corps combine economy and efficiency so that the maximum amount of work can be properly accomplished by the limited numbers of personnel available. . . . To do so, this Division proposes that the Division of Plans and Policies be abolished and that, to replace it, there be organized a General and Special Staff based upon the present sections of the Division of Plans and Policies, but with the executive staff sections headed by general officers where possible. The resulting General and Special Staff sections should be assigned the executive, supervisory, and coordinative authority normally delegated to a General and Special Staff, . . .

One of the real innovations of this plan was the suggestion of the Special Staff in addition to the General Staff. The organizational chart of this staff is shown in Figure 4 on page 24. The reasoning behind it is as follows:

During the last war the Marine Corps maintained only one Fleet Marine Force, whose headquarters performed many of the functions involved in the coordination and supervision of its component parts, as well as developing the tactics, techniques, and equipment of amphibious operations. Today, there are two (2) Fleet Marine Forces, and many of the foregoing attendant duties devolve on this Headquarters. It is believed that the organization of a general and special staff at this Headquarters would greatly improve the performance of these functions. . . .

¹Division of Plans and Policies Study Number 23-49, submitted as a memorandum to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Reorganization of the Division of Plans and Policies as General and Special Staff, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, dated 16 March 1949.

SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS PROPOSED IN DIV. P&P STUDY NO. 23-49




FIGURE 4.

Source: Division of Plans and Policies Study Number 23-49,
dated 16 March 1949

Provision should be made in the special staff sections for responsibility for those functions peculiar to amphibious operations. By this means constant development of our amphibious techniques and equipment will be enhanced.

This can now be identified as an early awareness of the rising need for an active research and development program. The memorandum went on to discuss in detail the areas of responsibility to be covered by each staff section and department. There was considerable reaction to this plan. The views of the major departments and divisions to be affected by this change were attached to this study as follows:

Comments of the Assistant Commandant
dated 28 Mar 1949

One of the significant objections to Plans and Policies Study 23-49 concerns the exercise of supervision by the proposed staff sections. Supervision is one of the accepted functions of a staff; the others are in general, furnishing of information, drawing up of plans and coordination of effort. . . . In the past, although its charter did not provide for it, the Commandant has relied in part on the Division of Plans and Policies to assist him by performing general staff functions of coordination and supervision. Plans and Policies Study 23-49 recognizes a situation which has existed by force of circumstances. The exercise of these functions by Plans and Policies has often been misunderstood as unwarranted interference. . . .

There appears also to be apprehension regarding the possibility of insulating division and department heads from the Commandant; that a chain of command will be established from the division or department through the appropriate general staff section, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff. In this connection, it has long been understood that "a commander's staff is not a part of the chain of command." A staff assists the commander in the exercise of his command functions. An officious staff officer may at times disregard these injunctions; the safeguard lies in the proper indoctrination of the staff.

Comments of Quartermaster General

. . . I believe that the General Staff System sets up in any organization; (sic) first, a favored few; second, the remainder who do the work and have no say according to their ability and experience of what is the best for an organization. It develops the caste system.

Comments of Director, Marine Corps Reserve

. . . Under the proposed plan some nineteen people must now contact him rather than the nine now doing so. Either the Chief of Staff will be swamped or, as is believed by the Division of Reserve and is the practice in most general staff groups, the general staff will restrict the access of special staff personnel and division and department heads to the Chief of Staff; or the Chief of Staff, of necessity, will direct that the special staff and division and department heads clear their business through the general staff section. . . .

The subject study would concentrate too much power in the new general staff (present Plans and Policies) for the overall good of the Corps. It would deny access to the Commandant of the Marine Corps by heads of departments who are more experienced in their particular fields, and would channelize and delay the Marine Corps administration to such an extent as to hamper and restrict the efficient operation of Marine Corps Headquarters.

These and other similar viewpoints were answered by the Director of the Plans and Policies Division as follows:

The assignment of supervisory functions to the staff is the crux of the whole matter. Its application is the only change proposed in the functioning, organization or duties of the divisions and departments of Headquarters Marine Corps other than Plans and Policies. The type of supervision intended is that described in paragraph 307, Chapter 3, U.S. Marine Corps Staff Manual, 1948. It is the type practiced throughout the last war, and now being practiced by all Fleet Marine Force staffs and with which most, if not all, Marine officers are familiar. It does not include or permit undue interference by the proposed staff in the affairs of

any other part of Headquarters Marine Corps. . . .¹

This Division believes the provision for such supervision to be a vitally necessary step, one which will obtain the many important advantages listed in the study. In fact, only two immediate advantages can be expected from the approval of Plans and Policies Study Number 23-49. One is "supervision;" the other is the institution of special staff sections to "head-up" the most important specialties in the Marine Corps, and thereby provide central agencies at this Headquarters to deal with similar agencies of the other services and Marine Corps units.²

This reorganization along general staff lines failed to find adequate support even with the approval of the Assistant Commandant. But interest in the concept continued. Later that same year a Special Marine Corps Logistics Service Board argued in favor of greater continuity and standardization in the area of logistics.³ This report stated that the "existing organizational

¹U.S. Marine Corps, Staff Manual, 1948, para. 307, p. 3-2, reads as follows:

Supervision:

(a) A staff officer supervises the execution of orders to insure understanding and execution in conformity with the commander's will. This supervision is effected by inspections and reports or through liaison officers.

(b) Staff supervision is the intelligent observation by staff officers, within their proper sphere of responsibility of the operation of subordinates and the application, when necessary, through proper channels, of corrective measures for the attainment of desired results.

(c) Staff officers accomplish supervision by advising other staff officers and subordinates of the commander's plans and policies, interpreting these plans and policies, assisting subordinates in carrying them out, and determining the extent to which they are being followed, and advising the commander relative thereto.

²Memorandum from the Director, Plans and Policies Division to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Division of Plans and Policies Study Number 23-49, concurrences and non-concurrences with., dated 16 March 1949.

³Report of Special Marine Corps Logistics Service Board, dated 13-27 July 1949.

structure within Marine Corps Headquarters is unsatisfactory in that logistics planning and implementation are not contained within one agency." Though this report did not recommend a general staff, it did recommend a greater unification of function and responsibility in both planning and execution phase. The Board recommended a new organizational chart shown in Figure 5, on page 29.

The Division of Plans and Policies had a new Director by this time. He did not agree with the view that having logistics planning and implementation under one structure was an advantage. In referring to the Board's conclusion to this effect he wrote:

The conclusion referred to above is diametrically opposed to proven principles of staff organization and procedures which separate planning agencies from those agencies charged with execution. . . .

Orthodox staff procedures normally separate planning and execution. This is essentially a system of checks and balances, designed to insure that the commander receives all divergent views on any given problem. This essential safeguard has been discarded under the organization proposed by this Board.¹

Thus the conflict of views about the organization of Headquarters continued. The structure that had evolved by 1949 is shown in Figure 6 on page 30. It should be noted that while the Fiscal Division is charted as an independent division, it was under the control of, and directed by, the Quartermaster General.

Implementation of the General Staff

The change to a general staff, so often urged, was implemented by the new Commandant on taking office in January, 1952.

¹Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and Policies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Study of Marine Corps Logistic Service, comments on., dated 12 August 1949.

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS ORGANIZATION
PROPOSED BY THE SPECIAL MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS SERVICE BOARD




FIGURE 5.

Source: Report of Special Marine Corps Logistics Service Board,
dated 13-29 July 1949.




FIGURE 6.

Source: Headquarters Manual, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,
1 December 1951, Part II, p. 2.

He expressed his views in a letter to all Marine Corps general officers as follows:

My first concern is with the organization of Marine Corps Headquarters itself. I have felt -- as I know many others have -- that this Headquarters could discharge its many functions with better effect and greater efficiency were its organizational structure simplified. I have studied the matter carefully over a number of years and it is my conviction that improvement can be achieved through greater decentralization and by reducing the number of subordinates reporting directly to me.

I intend to accomplish this by instituting a simple general staff organization of departmental character. It will be built largely around the existing structure of the Division of Plans and Policies, with the G-1, G-3, and G-4 Sections each headed by a General Officer. Those officers will be responsible to me, through the Chief of Staff, for accomplishing the routine duties peculiar to their sections, as well as for supervising and directing the activities of certain related special staff sections.

Insofar as organization at the top is concerned, there are three points which will be of interest to you. First, I intend to emphasize the Chief of Staff aspect of the Office of Assistant Commandant. . . .


Second, there will be established a Deputy Chief of Staff to extend and enhance the supervisory capacity of the Chief of Staff and to act in his absence.

Third, there will be established a Secretary of the General Staff to ensure that staff work coming forward for my or the Chief of Staff's action is in fact completed, and that necessary coordination has been effected.

It is my intention to separate the Marine Corps' budgetary and supply functions. I contemplate establishing an Office of the Budget, Statistics and Reports to coordinate our fiscal effort and to concentrate in one place the maximum possible number of those statistics which are essential to a proper operation of this Headquarters.¹

The organizational chart that evolved by the middle of 1952 is shown in Figure 7 on page 32. The significant changes

¹Letter from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to all Marine Corps general officers, Subject: Remarks by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to Staff on 2 Jan 1952, dated 3 Jan 52.



Source: Condit and Johnstone, p. 30.

FIGURE 7.

as reflected in the new organization are as follows:¹

1. The Division of Plans and Policies was dissolved. Its four main sections were elevated to Division status.
2. The Quartermaster General was relieved of fiscal duties by the separation of the Fiscal Division.
3. A Policy Analysis Division was created.

The reorganization did not result in the general staff exercising supervision and coordination over other departments. Though these supervisory capacities had been considered of paramount importance in earlier proposals, the implementation resulted in a relationship such that "the Quartermaster General's Department, Personnel Department, Reserve, Aviation, Public Information, Administrative, and Fiscal Division not be subordinated to any General Staff section; . . ."²

However, the Commandant did emphasize the Chief of Staff role of the Assistant Commandant. He was provided assistance in his general supervisory duties by a Deputy Chief of Staff and a centralization of administrative assistance in the Office of the Secretary of the General Staff. The Chief of Staff and General Staff were installed and at the same time the separation of planning and policy from execution was maintained. This dichotomy has remained to the present day.

¹Condit and Johnstone, pp. 28-29.

²Notes on Conferences on Headquarters Marine Corps Reorganization, dated 5 February 1952.

Public Law 416

Soon after the institution of the General Staff there was another development that was to have a very significant effect upon Headquarters, Marine Corps functioning. The Congress enacted Public Law 416 which established a permanent strength for the Marine Corps and defined the relationship of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This law made clear the position of the Marine Corps in the National Security Establishment and evidenced a determination to safeguard the amphibious force-in-readiness aspect of the Marine Corps.¹

The impact this had on the functioning of Headquarters was vast because it greatly increased the administrative load of the Marine Corps. It made the Marine Corps clearly a separate service within the Navy Department. There had long been considerable confusion about the relationship between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant. There had been a tendency over the years to treat the Marine Corps administratively within the Navy Department as another bureau. This issue was resolved by the Secretary of the Navy when he issued Navy General Order Number Five on 4 June 1953. This clarified the independence of the Marine Corps as a second service beside the Navy within the Navy Department. However, it also had the effect of somewhat removing the mantle of protection from outside influences that CNO had previously given the Marine Corps. From this time on the Marine Corps Headquarters found that it could no longer concern itself primarily

¹Marine Corps Order 5410 dated 5 Jul 1952.

with internal problems.

This increased independence within the Navy Department was occurring simultaneously with the rise in the significance of interservice, unified activities brought about by the newly created Department of Defense. Section 211 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947 was amended by Public Law 416 to read as follows:

The Commandant of the Marine Corps shall indicate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff any matter scheduled for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which directly concerns the United States Marine Corps. Unless the Secretary of Defense, upon request from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a determination, determines that such matter does not concern the United States Marine Corps, the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when such matter is under consideration by them and on such occasion and with respect to such matter the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall have co-equal status with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The burden of screening JCS activities and participating in matters of concern to the Marine Corps was initially absorbed by the existing Headquarters staff sections. A major portion of the support was provided by Plans Branches in the G-3 and G-4 Divisions. As the amount of JCS participation increased the Commandant found it necessary to assign the Deputy Chief of Staff as his operations deputy responsibility for coordinating staff action necessary to support the Commandant in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He did so on 15 February 1955.¹

Recent Changes

By mid-1956 the Deputy Chief of Staff's responsibilities

¹Condit and Johnstone, p. 29.

had expanded to where it became necessary to divide them between two offices. There was appointed a Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans who was to "assist the Chief of Staff in directing, coordinating and supervising staff activities in the fields of planning, programming, budgeting, and joint service matters. . . . Serve as the Commandant's Operations Deputy with respect the JCS matters. " In addition there was appointed a Deputy Chief of Staff (Research and Development) who would "assist the Chief of Staff in directing, coordinating, and supervising staff activities in the fields of research and development. . . . Represent the Commandant on departmental and intradepartmental councils, boards and committees concerned with policy making and over-all coordination in the fields of research and development."¹

The rise in significance of research and development (R&D) in the Marine Corps paralleled that occurring in the other services. It was further enhanced during this era by the developmental mission assigned the Marine Corps by the National Security Act in matters regarding amphibious warfare. The Commandant described the Marine Corps R&D program as follows:

The National Security Act of 1947 as amended charges the Marine Corps with a responsibility for development of tactics and techniques related to landing operations. To carry out this responsibility, the Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps directs a research and development effort embracing tactics, techniques, weapons and equipment related to amphibious warfare. The great bulk of the material research and development program is carried out by transfer of funds to the Bureaus of the Department of the Navy. Some transfers are made to other departments, and some work is done on

¹Headquarters Order 1600.2 dated 27 June 1956.

contract.¹

The duties of Assistant Commandant were split from those of Chief of Staff in December of 1957. Under the new organization the Assistant Commandant was to perform the duties of the Commandant during the latter's absence or disability, and perform such other duties as the Commandant may specifically direct. The mission of the Chief of Staff was described as follows:

The Chief of Staff is the Commandant's executive officer. He directs, coordinates, and supervises staff activities at Headquarters Marine Corps, and performs such other duties as the Commandant may specifically direct. He performs the duties of Assistant Commandant in the latter's absence.²

The duties of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff were not changed.

Electronic computers came into the Marine Corps during the mid-fifties. In 1957 data processing was defined as "an inclusive term to indicate the entire field of manual, mechanized, electrical, and electronic record-keeping, accounting and data processing."³ The Director of the Administrative Division was given primary staff cognizance with respect to data-processing in the Marine Corps. In response to this responsibility a Management Engineering Branch was formed within the Administrative Division. This consolidated what had been the Management Branch and the Machine Accounting Branch. This was done because:

It has been determined that organizational consolida-

¹Letter from Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Chief of Naval Operation, Subject: Organization of the Federal Government for Scientific Activities; Marine Corps submission thereto, dated 26 June 1961.

²Headquarters Order 5430.1 dated 9 Oct 1957.

³Headquarters Order 10462.1 dated 12 June 1957.

tion of data-processing functions and related management engineering services is necessary to accomplish, most efficiently, the responsibilities assigned.¹

However, computers were purchased as they were needed by functional departments. The first computers were purchased for inventory control and were operated by the Quartermaster within the Supply Department. Subsequently the Personnel Department acquired computers for use in personnel management. In each case the computer programmers worked for the department that owned the computer. Although the Director of the Administrative Division had over-all data processing responsibilities, he had no personnel trained for these duties. In 1960 a separate Data Processing Division was established.²

The purpose of creating this Division was stated in a special bulletin issued by the Commandant.³ This bulletin pointed out that the division of the use of computers along functional lines has resulted in all of the programmers working for either the Quartermaster or the Personnel Department.

Accordingly, there was no one to work on data processing problems in other areas of the Marine Corps. The establishment of a Data Processing Division puts all programmers under the cognizance of one person who is responsible for all Marine Corps interest with respect to data processing.

It was noted that the new, centralized arrangement would allow a better identification and allocation of computer costs according

¹Headquarters Order 5450.2 dated 29 August 1957.

²Headquarters Order 5430.4 dated 3 August 1960.

³Headquarters Bulletin 5430 dated 25 August 1960.

to use of the computer.

A major change in the Data Processing Division's mission occurred on 30 December 1964. On that date the Data Processing Division was redesignated the Data Systems Division.¹ To assist the Director of this division there was appointed an Assistant Director for Data Processing and an Assistant Director for Management Systems Development. The former was assigned responsibility for what had essentially been the duties of the Data Processing Division. The duties of the latter represent recognition of the growing problems of management information systems. This recognition resulted from a clear indication of need for action found in a study conducted by the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs.)²

This study summarizes the forces creating a need for an integrated information system. These forces arise from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, Marine Corps boards, and studies conducted by Headquarters staff sections and other Marine Corps activities. It calls attention to the need for a better capability to integrate and improve the many information subsystems that have come to exist at Headquarters over the years.

The responsibilities of the Assistant Director for Management Systems Development, then, includes both internal information needs and those associated with information systems external to the

¹Headquarters Order 5200.4 dated 30 December 1964.

²Memorandum for the Commandant of the Marine Corps from the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs), enclosing Study No. 1-1964, Subject: Totally Integrated Strategic, Tactical and Management Information System, dated 16 Nov 1964.

Marine Corps. Though he is located organizationally under the Director of the Data Systems Division, he also has direct responsibilities to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) since responsibility for all matters concerning management information systems has been assigned to him. His assistant, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs), has been given specific responsibility for coordination of staff activity with regard to matters related to the Department of the Navy Management Information Center.¹ The Director of the Data Systems Division has responsibility for technical action required for the development of an Integrated Management Information System.² The Assistant Director for Management Systems Development will therefore be responsible to the Director, Data Systems Division with regard to technical aspects, and at the same time be responsible to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) regarding other aspects of management information systems.

In 1961 the Marine Corps established the Emergency Actions Center.³ This was a separate office in the Headquarters, under the cognizance of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. Its mission as stated in the original order was:

To provide a continuously manned, secure operating facility, with the capability of emergency communication linkage with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

¹Headquarters Order 5220.3 dated 28 Dec 1964.

²Headquarters Order 5200.4 dated 30 Dec 1964.

³Headquarters Order 05400.3 dated 1 March 1961.

other service operation centers at their primary and alternate locations and all commands as appropriate, which is capable of rapid dissemination of information and instructions.

With the increased importance of Department of Defense operational activities, the Emergency Actions Center has been redesignated the Marine Corps Command Center. In addition to being responsive to Joint Chiefs of Staff Emergency Action procedures it is now responsible for the following mission:¹

The Director, Marine Corps Command Center (MCCC), under the direction of the Chief of Staff and in support of the Commandant and the Headquarters Staff, plans for and supervises the operation of the Marine Corps Command Center in accordance with principles outlined in Department of Defense directives pertinent to the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

During the early sixties there occurred a better integration of Marine Corps aviation within Headquarters. The Director of Aviation was redesignated the Deputy Chief of Staff (Air), effective 25 April 1962.² He continued to be the Director of the Division of Aviation. The Chief of Staff explained the status of this new office to the Director, Administrative Division as follows:

The current Headquarters Marine Corps Organization Chart shows that the Chief of Staff has two principal assistants who "assist in directing, coordinating, and supervising." The added Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) likewise would assist the Chief of Staff. . . . The Division of Aviation is retained and is shown on the organization chart at the same level as the General Staff Divisions and the Fiscal Division.³

¹Headquarters Order P5000.3A, Vol. I, Para. 15000, dated 18 Dec. 1964.

²Headquarters Order 5400.6 dated 26 April 1962.

³Memorandum from the Chief of Staff to the Director, Administrative Division, Subject: Headquarters Marine Corps Organizational Chart, dated 6 June 1962.

However, the Division of Aviation was gradually dissolved. Its functions were taken over by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Air). By late 1963 the Division of Aviation ceased to exist as an organizational entity. The net result of this change was a more centralized responsibility for aviation matters at a higher level in the Headquarters organization concurrent with an integration of operational activities with other elements of Headquarters.

The other Deputy Chiefs of Staff also underwent changes in 1962 and in more recent times. The office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans) was augmented to provide more comprehensive assistance to that office in the field of both planning and programming during May of 1962.¹ This augmentation consisted of moving the function of programming from the Plans Branch of the G-3 to the Office of Assistant for Programs within the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans).² This move was occasioned by the increased complexity and importance of programming under current Defense Department management. By late 1964 the name of the office had been changed to that of Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs). In addition to the original JCS responsibilities he is to assist the Chief of Staff in the fields of planning, programming and budgeting.³ There is an assistant deputy for plans and another for pro-

¹Headquarters Order 5400.7 dated 14 May 1962 .

²Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans) to the Chief of Staff, Subject: Reorganization of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans), dated 7 May 1962.

³Headquarters Order P5000.3A, Vol. I, Para. 1053, dated 18 Dec 1964.

grams.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (R&D) was augmented during March of 1962 and was designated Appropriation Sponsor for the Marine Corps portion of the RDT&E (N) Appropriation and was made Program Coordinator of the R&D Program.¹ This office has recently been redesignated as the Deputy Chief of Staff (Research, Development and Studies).² This change in title reflects the added responsibility for coordinating the Marine Corps study program, both with respect to internal studies and those initiated elsewhere in the Department of Defense.

Current Organization

The organizational chart that had evolved as of 10 December 1964 is shown in Figure 8 on page 44. Note that since that time the Data Processing Division has become the Data Systems Division. Under this organization the Chief of Staff has the following twenty-three separate activities, offices or parties reporting directly to him:

- Three Deputy Chiefs of Staff
- Fourteen Division and Departments
- Six Staff Assistants
- Secretary of the General Staff

This mammoth challenge brings new life to the comment the Director, Division of Plans and Policies made twenty years ago:

¹Headquarters Order 5400.5 dated 30 March 1962.

²Headquarters Order P5000.3A, Vol I, Para. 1054, dated 18 Dec 1964.




FIGURE 8.

This current departmental organization has grown much in the same manner as a house built by a man planning for a family of two and who, as time passed, found his family increasing beyond the capacity of the house as originally built. Rooms have been added at random from time to time as the need arose. As times have changed, the design of the rooms have changed, with the result that the various parts of the house are of dissimilar character. Some of the occupants are now mature and have children of their own, and in order to avoid too intimate contact with other members of the family, they have constructed separate kitchens, and doors to their rooms permitting separate exits to the outside. While the head of the family pays all the bills and sets certain standards for the complex house, he has no means, except personal inspection, of knowing how well or poorly his desires are being carried out or who is doing the housework; - and the head of the house is a busy man.¹

The purpose of this first chapter has been to trace the development of the current Headquarters organization from its earliest form to that of the present. There has been an attempt to present some documentation of the thinking that was behind many of the changes that occurred. The next section will trace the organizational theories involved in more general and theoretical terms.

¹Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and Policies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: The Organization of Marine Corps Headquarters, dated 30 June 1944.

CHAPTER II

THE DERIVATION OF THE CURRENT ORGANIZATION

The Theory of the General Staff

In attempting to analyze the validity of the present, basic organization of Headquarters, Marine Corps one must consider the reasons that give rise to a staff. The head of the traditional military organization is known as the commander, or, as in the case of the Marine Corps, the commandant. He sits at the apex of a typically rigid, pyramidal hierarchy. He holds the authority and responsibility for all below him. His power is supreme and we speak of a commander "running" his command. This is a concept that is essential to military functioning under the life and death conditions of combat. However, as the size and complexity of the command structure increases, Reis notes that

. . . it was recognized that a commander needed assistance. This assistance was provided by the staff. Its function was to gather information, offer solutions, recommend concrete lines of action, and oversee the execution of resulting orders.¹

This is the extension-of-the-commander concept of the staff. It provides a recognition of his need for assistance in controlling, directing and supervising his command or unit.

There is a second, less noted justification for a staff. This is in the fact that there are services needed by subordinate

¹John C. Reis, The Management of Defense (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 22.

units that cannot be economically performed at their level. This may be due to the fact that the support such services require are beyond the capability of subordinate units. It may also be because the quantity of the service needed does not aggregate adequately at lower levels to justify placing the capability there. It is not surprising that we often fail to note as separate this second aspect of the staff.

The logic of the rigid hierarchy of the General Staff is irrefutable in the environment of battle. In addition, the functional breakdown of personnel, intelligence, operations and training, and logistics fit perfectly into the essential nature of military action. As a result, the officers who head these four staff departments form the "right arm" of the commander. They serve as the commander's experts who advise and plan within their functional areas. In doing this advising and planning, a good deal of their time is spent setting policy, either directly or indirectly. Within their functional areas they also directly supervise activities performed by subordinate commanders.

Along with, and generally subordinate to, these general staff officers are officers who function in a narrower, more strictly functional capacity. Examples of these would be the legal officer who works for the personnel officer; the supply officer and the motor transport officer who work for the logistics officer; the chemical-biological-and-radiological warfare officer who works for the operations and training officer, etc. In addition to the activities of these staff officers being more specialized than those of the general staff officer, their functions are diverse,

even within the same general staff section. Some have functions that are reinforcements of the general staff officer's directing, controlling and supervising function. Others are more independent, service-to-subordinate-commanders types of activity. These officers may exist separately, with direct lines of responsibility to the commander, but in most cases they exist within, and are supervised by, one of the general staff sections. These officers who are concerned with specific, narrow areas will be referred to as special staff officers.

In summary, then, the general staff officers exist because the commander is unable himself to actively supervise, participate in, and be cognizant about all of the activities in which his organization is involved. He, like other mortals, can be neither omnipresent nor omniscient. Tables of organization have developed, therefore, to give him a staff with which to supplement or extend his own capabilities. This is the means by which the commander increases his capacity to act in consonance with the principle that "successful management depends- not alone, but significantly- upon the ability to predict and control human behavior."¹ The general staff officers are assisted by special staff officers who operate in specialized areas. While this staff also performs a service-to-subordinate-commanders type of function, under the general staff concept we have traditionally focused the greatest attention on the extension-of-the-commander aspects of the staff functioning. They are, under present methods of command, the more important.

¹Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 4.

Staff supervision and coordination is critical to the information gathering, decision-making process that is the essence of military command.

This appropriateness of the general staff concept to the military command problem led to a love-affair between it and the military mind that continued unremittently for more than twenty years after World War I. This organization was considered appropriate for every level of Army organization. J.D. Hittle, writing in 1949, notes the move away from traditional General Staff concepts that was occurring at the time in the Army General Staff. While admitting some valid basis for change due to the Army General Staff's peculiar position and role in the Department, he goes on to say:¹

Yet advantage of adhering as closely as possible, from the highest to the lowest staff level, to the standard four-sectional staff should be readily apparent. This system, the product of centuries of staff evolution, provides for a simple but comprehensive grouping of command and staff functions. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a function that could not be properly grouped under one of the four general staff sections. However, since no system can be made completely appropriate for all situations, the standard four-sectional staff is occasionally modified temporarily or varied so as to be more responsible to unusual requirements confronting a commander. . . .

In the proper application of our staff doctrine such variations from the standard are kept to the minimum, and are resorted to only when it is positively determined that normal staff organization and procedures are inadequate for a particular situation.

The extent of this devotion to the four section organization in the U.S. Army was commented upon by General W. B. Palmer as follows:

1J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff, rev. ed. (Harrisburg, Penn.: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1949), p. 195.

. . . those magic numbers (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4) for the top General Staff . . . became symbols of the True Faith which was brilliantly expounded in our service schools for two decades; and in the course of this exposition we became entrapped in a fallacious theory that an identical system of staff numbering should prevail from the Battalion through every echelon of command to include the War Department.-

It is not difficult to trace the inspiration for the General Staff in the Headquarters of the Marine Corps to the very source suggested by General Palmer.

The Marine Corps Advocate of the General Staff

The Director of the Division of Plans and Policies during 1944 and 1945 had been trained in this General Staff theory. He had attended the Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia and the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was proud of his knowledge of the general staff system.² The belief that the general staff system could bring to Headquarters the same tightened control at the top which characterized combat units is evidenced in the following passage from his memorandum to the Commandant:

It is of the greatest importance to note that the shortcomings outlined above are all an outgrowth of organizational factors, and further that they may be promptly and effectively eradicated by the institution in this Headquarters of an organization founded on the General Staff system. In such an organization, these serious weaknesses involving lack of supervision, coordination, and information promptly disappear. Until some such organization is provided, the operation of Marine Corps Headquarters must continue on a disjointed basis, de-

¹Palmer, W. B., "The General Staff, U.S. Army," Armed Forces Management, (October, 1957), p. 10.

²Interview with Lt. Gen. G. C. Thomas, USMC(Ret), on 28 Jan 65.

pending mainly on cooperation for conduct of its daily business.¹

He was not alone in his knowledge and training along general staff lines. Most other line officers in the general ranks at this time had likewise been trained in Army schools. However, it was he who was its strongest advocate. He became the first Assistant Commandant/Chief of Staff under the General Staff when it was put in in 1952. He contributed in large measure to the portions of the "Remarks by Commandant of the Marine Corps to Staff" on 2 January 1952 that pertained to this subject,² and which are quoted in Chapter I. This document and the various memoranda clearly indicate that it was the hope and intent of both he and the Commandant to put a true centralized General Staff at Headquarters, Marine Corps. The need for a General Staff with its ability to exercise a supervisory role over the other parts of the staff had repeatedly been stressed.

When one considers the organizational structure that evolved by 1 July 1952 (as shown in Figure 7 on page 32) it is evident that the General Staff was not given this supervisory power. One might well ask what overcame the intent expressed so repeatedly by so many and as recently as January of that year by the Commandant himself. The answer lies in the efforts of the Quartermaster General.

¹Memorandum from Director, Division of Plans and Policies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: The Organization of Marine Corps Headquarters, dated 30 June, 1944.

²Interview with Lt. Gen. G. C. Thomas, USMC(Ret), on 28 Jan 65.

The Marine Corps Antagonist of the General Staff

In a consideration of how and why the Quartermaster General of 1952 was able to frustrate the intent of the Commandant and the Assistant Commandant lies the key to understanding the present organization of Headquarters, Marine Corps. In addition, some yet unresolved problem areas in staffing the Headquarters become evident.

The first aspect we will consider is how the Quartermaster was able to frustrate the aims of the Commandant. A combination of personality and events placed him in an unusually fine position to prevent the implementation of a real general staff. He had had his office for more than a decade- and had become very strong politically. It was a natural and historic role for the Quartermaster to deal with Congress as a witness before appropriation committees. This particular Quartermaster had during his unusually long tenure, built a very strong rapport, both personally and professionally, with many members of Congress.

In addition to this political power, he was keenly aware of his statutory power. As was indicated in Chapter I, the laws in effect at that time gave separate and distinct duties and responsibilities to three offices at Marine Corps Headquarters: the Commandant, the Quartermaster General, and the Director of Personnel. When it came right down to the final issue, it was the ability of the Quartermaster General to point out the legality of his independent position that prevented his Supply Department from being placed under the supervision of the G-4. He pointed

out that regardless of what organizational structure was created, he would continue to perform his statutory duties.¹

We have seen how the Quartermaster prevented the installation of the General Staff. We might now ask why he so acted.

The Line Versus The Staff

The Quartermaster General resisted the General Staff because he felt that the interests of the Supply Department were threatened. This feeling arose from the fact that a line officer would have been placed in a supervisory position over the Supply Department. The Quartermaster General would not have been acceptable as the G-4 in the new General Staff.² This is consistent with the history of the struggle outlined in Chapter I within the triumvirate of the Office of the Commandant (staffed by line officers), the Supply Department (staffed by quartermasters), and the Personnel or Adjutant-Inspector Department. As evidenced in the various memoranda quoted in Chapter I, it was the desire of the line officers to put line officers clearly in a supervisory capacity over the departments that were considered analogous to the special staff. That is, the line officers such as the Director of Plans and Policies felt that there should be a general staff to supervise and coordinate the departments that consisted of specialists (typified by the supply duty only officers or quartermasters)

¹Interview with Maj. Gen. W. P. T. Hill, USMC(Ret), on 10 Feb., 1965.

²Ibid.

who were concerned with more narrow, functional areas. It would be inconsistent with this basic philosophy to install a specialist (the Quartermaster General) in a General Staff billet. The General Staff concept required a person with broad line experience and background.

The Quartermaster General, on the other hand, felt it absolutely essential to have someone highly qualified in the functional area to supervise the supply function. He questioned the ability of a line officer with little or no previous supply experience to properly perform a supervisory function in the supply area.¹

The conflict can now be recognized in its most fundamental question: What should be the qualifications of the staff officer who supervises, directs and controls a functional area? The conflict between the staff specialist (typified by the quartermaster, after 1946 called a "supply duty only" officer), with detailed knowledge in a narrow, functional area versus the general staff officer, a man with varied duty experience, is deeply embedded in this issue. In Chapter I it was pointed out that the Marine Corps committed itself to the separation of the two in 1847 and then it reversed its stand in 1917. We might ask if it did so in a responsible manner.

Ideally the conflict between the staff specialist and the line officer would be resolved by a compromise solution, resulting in the best of both approaches. The aim of detailing is to do this. The theory of the detail system is that it will give staff

¹Ibid.

billets constant infusions of line experience and outlook. In addition, the line officer corps will develop more detailed knowledge of the functional staff areas.

If we examine this general statement we can see a cause of difficulty. From the viewpoint of developing good line officers, the more varied the staff experiences the better. From the viewpoint of developing good staff officers, with real insight into the various functional areas, the more similar the staff experiences, the better. Since the detail system was installed at the same time as the elimination of separate corps of staff specialists it seems obvious that its original purpose was to provide an alternative source for good staff officers. Because the detailing system has since focused on developing better line officers, it has failed to adequately achieve its original purpose. This failure justifies the concerns of the Quartermaster General. The use of the detail system with primary stress on developing line officers leaves unanswered the problem of filling technical staff billets.

The problems created by the resulting 1952 organization were many. The confrontation between the General Staff advocates and the interests represented by the Quartermaster General resulted in an organizational structure that failed to simplify the organization and failed to provide the supervision, coordination, and control intended. Once it was determined that the separate departments and sections could not be placed under the General Staff the value of implementating the General Staff became questionable. The structure that resulted in 1952 lacks elements

essential to the realization of the benefits of a General Staff structure-tight control at the top by the use of a small functional staff. Instead of creating clear, functional general staff sections the new organization increased confusion by increasing the total number of personnel who report to the Chief of Staff and by installing duplication in the number of people who report directly to him in some functional areas. The specific problems to which this gave rise are discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

AN APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT ORGANIZATION

Overlap of Responsibilities

One can nowhere find a statement of the theory under which Headquarters, Marine Corps is organized. The reason for this is, of course, that the structure that has been adopted has no supporting theory. As was narrated in the last chapter, it was never even intended. It is two systems, an old alongside a new that was to replace it.

Since the adoption of the present organization, several rationales have arisen that attempt to explain it as based on valid theory. It is sometimes stated that the General Staff is concerned with the plans and policies and the Division and Departments are concerned with the execution of these. Another justification is that the General Staff is concerned with Marine Corps wide interests, as opposed to the narrow, functional views of the operators.¹

The first, general objection to these theories is that even were they valid, the duplication of responsibility in functional areas tremendously complicates the problem of coordination and control. People who attempt to work at Headquarters are acutely aware of this. An organizational structure should have exactly

¹Interview with Lt. Gen. G. C. Thomas, USMC(Ret), 28 January, 1965.

the opposite effect. Organizational structures exist to simplify and assist in the coordination and control effort.

A second objection is that the duplication deprives people working at Headquarters of the satisfaction of having broad responsibilities within a defined functional area. The system is based on the premise that one can stop the doers from thinking and the thinkers from doing without adverse effects on morale. This is a questionable principle in a human system.

A third objection, allied to the first, is that the present organization inherently creates confusion. While clear, sharp lines of responsibility will seldom exist, they should be sought as an objective. The potential for duplication of responsibility under current organization is in direct contrast with this objective. The present organization requires that a great deal of time and effort be continually devoted to the problem of determining division of responsibility. In addition to being wasteful, this is destructive of morale among those who attempt to operate on the working level. No matter how carefully the division of duties is worked out on the basis of plans and policies versus operations, it is a task that is never done. Issues constantly arise. Now, after more than two decades, there is still considerable duplication. This overlap exists even in assigned missions and functions. The following examples of possible areas of confusion are taken from current Headquarters Manual, Volume II.¹

The mission of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, is restricted to formulating plans, policies and instructions regard-

¹Headquarters Order P500.3A, Change 2, dated 18 Dec. 64.

ing manpower and personnel matters. However, among his functions listed the exercise of centralized control over the allocation and distribution of available manpower, military and civilian, within the Marine Corps. He is also to exercise staff supervision to ensure compliance with the Commandant's orders and instructions dealing with manpower and personnel matters. At the same time, the mission of the Director of Personnel includes responsibility for the distribution of officers and enlisted personnel. This gives rise to the question of the difference between the distribution of manpower (a G-1 function) and the distribution of officers and enlisted personnel (a Personnel Department function).

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is concerned with the formulation of policies, plans, and programs in various operational areas. The first of the stated functions of the G-3 is to develop and coordinate military policy for the Marine Corps as it relates to employment, force requirements, and readiness systems. The second function is to coordinate military policy and strategic and operational matters, as required, with the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Joint Staff. At the same time, the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) is to coordinate staff action in matters pertaining to Joint Chief of Staff participation and assist in the directing, coordinating, and supervising of staff activities in the fields of planning, programming and budgeting. Where do the responsibilities of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) end and those of the G-3 begin?

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, is responsible in his mission for logistics plans and policies and the determination of

requirements and program objectives and programs relating to material readiness. His functions include responsibility for planning, coordinating, and supervising the material programs for the logistic support of the Marine Corps. His operational counterpart, the Quartermaster General, is given the mission of responsibility for the management of the Marine Corps Supply System. There would seem to be need for plans and policies (a G-4 function) in fulfilling the management responsibility (Supply Department). It is not surprising that the Supply Department has a Plans, Programs, and Systems Office. Other Supply Department functions include the computation of material requirements for the peacetime operating forces and mobilization plans of the Marine Corps and the procurement and administration of all logistical services required by the Marine Corps. The G-4 and Supply Department responsibilities thus provide the widest possible base for misunderstanding.

The point of narrating these areas of mission and function conflict within the organizational structure of Headquarters is not to prove that the system cannot work. It has been made to work by Marines. But it should be obvious that in making the organization work these areas of confusion require constant definition and redefinition. This unnecessarily raises the price Marines must pay to make the system work.

A fourth objection to the plans and policies versus operators dichotomy is that the duplicate staffing that results is unnecessary. It need not exist along with the philosophy of the detail system. The main point of the detail system is to staff the Headquarters with officers with line experience. These men

have had broad, Marine Corps wide experience. They are the best qualified to be concerned with and deal with Marine Corps wide interests. They are generalists by training and experience. The additional creation of both generalist and specialist structures within the Headquarters organization is therefore redundant.

A last objection to the separation of the planners from the operators has been expressed as follows:

The only persons who can and do translate policy-statements of aspirations into operational reality are those charged with performing the various tasks constituting the performance or output of the organization. Conversely, they are the only ones in the organization with the information, ideas, and suggestions necessary for strong, imaginative and effective policy. When the entire thinking and planning function is assigned to a "think group", or a planning staff, there is a question that these groups simply are not qualified to answer: Is the policy or plan adapted to reality?¹

The Changing Mission of the Commandant

It is in some ways ironic that the General Staff concept was implemented, however feebly, in 1952. With hindsight it is apparent that that was the very time at which the General Staff structure became inappropriate for the management of Headquarters, Marine Corps. The General Staff is intended to assist the military commander of troops under operational conditions. The four functional sections are appropriate to the areas of concern to him. They are hardly descriptive of the total, major functional responsibilities of the Commandant today. Since the staff exists solely to assist the Commandant, a review of his duties and res-

¹Reis, p. 201.

possibilities will help in evaluating the appropriateness of his staff organization.

Until after World War II the exact duties and responsibilities of the Commandant of the Marine Corps were vague and indefinite. We can say, however, that he was primarily concerned with activities within the Marine Corps. He was under the protective mantle of the Chief of Naval Operations and other Navy Department Offices against external forces. Under these conditions the General Staff organization may have been appropriate.

However, with the National Security Act of 1947 as amended by Public Law 416 his duties and responsibilities changed. The orientation of his duties became increasingly external to the Marine Corps and even to the Navy Department. A greater part of the Commandant's effort is given to participation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in Defense Department activities. He also has an increased responsibility for Research and Development.

Inflexibility of the General Staff Concept

It is evident that such activities and areas of responsibility are not well suited to the General Staff limitation of four functional areas. It has been suggested that the existence of the General Staff hampers the proper recognition and handling of new major areas of concern. In relating the process of change by which the Army abandoned the General Staff organization, General Palmer states:

In 1946, when General Eisenhower reorganized the War Department from peacetime, the old numbered "Assistant Chief of Staff" General Staff elements were discontinued

altogether. . . . The payoff of abolishing the magic numbers was the appearance of research and development on the same level with the former owners of numbers; for so long as the General Staff had those numbers, it was very difficult to provide stature for a new function when it appeared. And if it did not get a number, it was not likely to acquire stature among people who had learned that all General Staff activities numbered G-something. . . . the top command was being called upon to take charge of another, a very significant, function which had no sacred number: control of the money.

So a detached observer could have seen by 1950 that the dogma of the Sacred Numbers was becoming a straitjacket. . . . he could have seen that Deputy Chiefs of Staff were being created merely to get around the rigidities of the G-1, 2, 3, 4, scheme of things.¹

An analogy to this concept can clearly be found in the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS) of the Marine Corps. The first DCS was provided simply as an assistant to the Chief of Staff. Then he became Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, which included specific responsibility for participation in JCS plans. (It is interesting to note that after World War I and II this need was met by the equivalent of a G-5 section). When Research and Development rose in importance during the fifties, another DCS was added. As General Palmer suggests, this type of evolution occurred because these offices would not find a resting place in the General Staff functional structure.

As these more appropriate staff offices have been created they have taken over many responsibilities previously held by the General Staff. Recent developments took important planning responsibilities performed by the G-3 and moved them to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs). Activities previously con-

¹Palmer, pp. 10-11.

ducted by the G-4 and Supply Department have likewise been moved to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Research and Development). These changes are attributable to several causes, but chief among these is the need to have more effective control of these new "functional" areas. The Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) initially was to coordinate the General Staff only. The General Staff sections were responsible for doing the work under his supervision and coordination. However it became apparent that the efficient execution of this function required an organization with greater control and unity. The same reasoning accounts for the centralization of the Research and Development function. It is a simple fact that when an activity becomes important to the Commandant, and fast, efficient action is required, a separate functional organization arises to meet the need. This reaction is entirely appropriate. It is unfortunate that it comes about because of urgent need and in spite of the existing organization rather than because of thoughtful planning. There has not been an adequate revaluation of the old along with the imposition of the new. Continuous revaluation of the basic organizational structure should be performed. Because of a failure to do this there has been a continual compounding of the complexity of interrelationships that started in 1952.

In summary, the major forces for change since 1952 have been met in the Marine Corps by offices that struggled to the surface at the Deputy Chief of Staff level. They exist there not because of any theoretical basis in General Staff organizational theory. Rather, they simply didn't fit into the traditional

General Staff structure and the Deputy Chief of Staff level was the only place to put them where they would be effective. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff serve well the major responsibilities of the Commandant which have evolved during the last decade. The problem is that there has been no basic revaluation and reorganization of the other staff agencies that support him. As a result, the imposition of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff level within the Headquarters has compounded the confusion of responsibilities that exist under the General Staff/separate departments and divisions dichotomy installed in 1952.

The next chapter will discuss a new force for change that is growing in its dimension and is rapidly becoming of major importance to the mission of the Commandant- information technology. The recent move to recognize the importance of this within the Data Systems Division (outlined in Chapter II) indicates that it will be forced to struggle to the surface much as did Plans, Programs, Studies and R&D. Hopefully it will have the stamina to do so quickly.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

The Advent of Information Technology

Among the forces acting upon the management of the Marine Corps today there is probably no area of equal importance with information technology. Since the nature of this new technology is nebulous and even largely unidentified in current organizational thinking, an attempt to define its significance should be made. The basic source of the problem is the computer. Computers are relatively new and are thought of as fast data processors. Originally they were simply that. However, the implications they have for management systems such as Headquarters, Marine Corps go far beyond simple data processing. The challenge of information technology is that it poses questions as new and foreign as the computers themselves. While the problems of information technology are not as obvious as those of research and development and planning, it is similar to them in that it provides a new functional area that does not fit within the General Staff structure. The aim of this chapter is to show that it is also like them in its importance to the mission of the Marine Corps.

By information technology is meant what Leavitt and Whisler described as including the following:

1. Technique for processing large amounts of information rapidly, and is epitomized by the high speed computer.

2. The application of statistical and mathematical methods to decision-making problems; it is represented by techniques like mathematical programming, and by methodologies like operational research.

3. The simulation of higher-order thinking through computer programs.¹

It is because of ever increasing complexity that there has universally been found the push to develop information technology. Increased complexity and the inability of any one man or small group of men to alone handle all the inputs to our broader, more complex decision-making has led to giving increased attention to the information processes in our organization. It became apparent that the decision-maker needed help. " . . . The obvious impact of the steadily increasing size, complexity, and geographic dispersion of organizations has been to accentuate the importance of having instrumentalities for informing management as to the results and status of operations."² The aim of information systems typically is to devise information collecting and analytic systems that will ensure, as much as possible, that no essential facts or variables are disregarded in making our decision. It is the computer that has given us a superhuman data collection, data handling and mathematical capability. The computer has, in turn, become a necessity for the use of the divers and highly sophisticated techniques used in solving the complex decision situations that it made possible.

¹Harold J. Leavitt and Thomas L. Whisler, "Management in the 1980's," Harvard Business Review, (Nov.-Dec., 1958), p. 41.

²Joseph Pois, "Evolutionary Role of the Financial Executive," Federal Accountant, Vol. XI, No. 3 (March, 1962), p. 39.

The use of quantitative analysis has become and will increasingly become a necessary tool for the military commander at every level. The stress on efficiency in our decision-making process and the capabilities of the computer has led to "increased reliance on systematic quantitative analysis to determine the most efficient alternative allocation and methods."¹ Otherwise accurate, timely analysis of the decision situations will become beyond the commander's capabilities because he could neither collect the data nor be certain to properly consider all decision situation elements.

This use of information technology typically starts at high levels, but it brings about changes that induce its use at lower and lower levels. All levels will inevitably become engaged. In recent times one could observe the stress on data collection and analytic techniques start at the Department of Defense and then descend to the service department level. This year, major Marine Corps commands and bases have received their first capability in this direction- IBM 1401 computers. In the areas of supply and tactical data wider use of computers is fait accompli. The move is now towards integrated information systems. It can be said without conjecture that the trend toward the tie-in of separate data systems into total, integrated information systems is clear and inevitable.

¹Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 108.

The Rising Level of Decision Making

For many years there was a trend in both the Marine Corps and industry towards decentralization of command. The inability of the central headquarters to collect and properly evaluate all the data led to this stress on decentralization. The decision-making process was increasingly placed at a lower level, where the volume of data was less; where the commander was closer to the facts; where fewer facts would be omitted; and where, therefore, a better decision could be made.

Up to 1955 no means, mechanical or otherwise was available to assure the manager that he has before him all relevant information bearing on the decisions he has to make. Consequently, decision-making, until relatively recently, has been an extremely risky business. In the absence of methods by which information could be collected and intelligently disseminated, it was thought to be necessary to decentralize the information gathering and dissemination process, in order to be able to operate at all, . . . The existence of computers and a new information technology have made the organizational concepts upon which arguments such as these are based completely obsolete.¹

Though this was said of a business environment, it is equally true of Headquarters, Marine Corps. The ability, through automatic data processing, to have facts collected at higher and higher levels will inevitably lead to more decision-making at those levels. This allows for tighter control at the top. It also permits decision-making at a level that sees the operation as a whole and therefore understands, in the broadest sense, the decision situation. A centralized concentration of the personnel and equip-

¹Gerald G. Fisch, "The Integrated Management Organization," Financial Executive, (May, 1964), pp. 13-14.

ment used in the information technology allows a higher level such as Headquarters to better cope with the increasingly complex, highly analytic techniques involved in the decision-making process at responsible levels.

If centralization becomes easier to implement, managers will probably revert to it. Decentralization has, after all, been largely negatively motivated. Top managers have backed into it because they have been unable to keep up with size and technology. They could not design and maintain the huge and complex communications systems that their large, centralized organization needed. Information technology should make recentralization possible. It may also obviate other major reasons for decentralization. For example, speed and flexibility will be possible despite large size, and top executives will be less dependent on subordinates because there will be fewer "experience" and "judgment" areas in which the junior men have more working knowledge. In addition, more efficient information-processing techniques can be expected to shorten radically the feedback loop that tests the accuracy of original observations and decisions.¹

There is no reason to believe that this will tend to be any less true of the military profession than elsewhere. We already see great strides in this direction within the Defense Department.

The Evolving Use of Information Technology Within the Marine Corps

The present and natural trend in the development and implementation of processes for the gathering and use of information in the Marine Corps is along functional lines. There have been dramatic and pioneering advances in the inventory control field conducted by the Supply Department. The personnel accounting system is developing its own data collection processes. Dis-

¹Leavitt and Whisler, p. 43.

bursing is involved in an automated pay system. In each field data collection provides the basis for an increased information flow, decision making techniques based on quantitative analysis, and, from these, improved management.

The hue and cry for integrated data systems has been made in the interest of eliminating duplication and reducing personnel and equipment requirements. While a simultaneous revaluation of the concepts of organization and functional breakdown of areas of responsibility might be appropriate, it has not been suggested. Rather, a day of great improvement in efficiency of our present organizational structure is seen ahead. The general staff, at all levels, now busy with data collection and the preparation of reports to higher authorities will be released from most of its repetitive, mundane tasks. The structured duties of the functional staff will be automated. Because of increased capabilities, more reliable and detailed information will be available. The general staff of tomorrow will be armed with better information. It will have more time and better information resources to devote to assisting the commander in controlling, directing and supervising his unit.

The advent of information technology can, then, be seen as providing increased effectiveness and opportunity for every commander and his staff. Logically it will result in greater centralization and higher levels of decision making. Computer applications will continue to develop along the same functional lines as the general staff and increase its efficiency and power. But a warning can be heard from the field of business management.

A suggestion is made:

Organizations can be thought of as lively sets of interrelated systems designed to perform complicated tasks. We can try to manipulate at least three dimensions of those systems in order to get the performance of tasks changed or improved. We can manipulate the organization structure . . . we can manipulate the tools and techniques used in the system. . . . We can enter from the people side, to change bodies, or attitudes, or inter-personal relation. . . . But we must never for a moment forget that when we tamper with any one of these three variables, structure or technology or people we are likely to cause significant effects on the others as well as on the task. (Italics mine.)¹

The Effects on Subordinates of the Evolving Use

There are many adverse effects that could be prophesied if the use of information technology continues to develop within the Marine Corps as we have just described. We should look closely at the whole result rather than just the beneficial results obtained from tightened controls that are apparent. It is the effects upon the personality traits and general development of subordinates involved in following this naturally evolving pattern that should become of prime concern. A greatly tightened control system would be destructive of characteristics that are critically needed in an organization with the mission of the Marine Corps.

There are many effects which we might anticipate. The first factor that will cause disruption is the rising level of decision making. How will the subordinate commander, be he a platoon commander or a commanding general, perceive this change? It has been observed that: "The role of authority in administra-

¹Harold J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology (2d. ed.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 325.

tion is often misunderstood by subordinates who may feel that the making of a decision at a higher level bespeaks a lack of confidence in them."¹

In more specific response to our question:

. . . we would predict that such a development elevation of the level of decision-making will be accompanied by hostile attitudes and resentment, not only among nonsupervisory personnel, but also among lower and middle levels of management. . . . Hostile attitudes will lead not only to the poorer execution of decisions based on analysis provided by the computer, but also to feeding the computer distorted and inaccurate information and measurements. The people involved will alter the data to protect themselves.²

Not only will the level of decision-making rise, but also an emancipated general staff, organized along functional lines, will be there to assist the commander in perfecting the system. This means the inducement of tighter and tighter controls since the staff will be free to spend more time expanding its interests. Data on more and more detailed functions can be collected. Closer and closer analysis can be made. More policies can be established. And there can be more supervision to ensure the policies are followed.

The support of this increased capability of the general staff would result in reports being required or data somehow collected in areas that traditionally had been left entirely to the subordinate. Such reports would have generated too much detail to be handled by upper echelons of command before the computer.

¹Joseph D. Cooper, The Art of Decision Making (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961), p. 95.

²Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961), p. 210.

These areas of uncollected data have always represented a threat to the general staff in that they were areas of uncertainty. The aim of the general staff is to reduce uncertainty. It seems easy to predict that the greater their capacity to collect data, the more data they will in fact collect.

The subordinate sees this data collection as a threat. He sees it as a sharing process- a giving up of part of what had been exclusively his. The more information the subordinate feels is removed from his exclusive control, the greater will be the reduction in his sense of importance and personal worth. Greater supervision means a confirmation of what the rising level of decision making also suggests- a decreasing trust in him.

In our society the physiological needs have been generally satisfied. It is at the higher social and egoistic level that men have their greatest need and commanders will today find their greatest challenge. The egoistic needs are of two kinds:¹

1. Those that relate to one's self-esteem: needs for self-respect and self-confidence, for autonomy, for achievement, for competence, for knowledge.

2. Those that relate to one's reputation: needs for status, for recognition, for appreciation, for the deserved respect of one's fellows:

It is at these egoistic needs that the effects of the evolution of control processes that is occurring will strike. They tend to reduce what few satisfactions our present command systems provide at this increasingly significant level of need.

¹McGregor, p. 38.

McGregor writes that people, deprived of opportunities to satisfy at work the needs which are now important to them will behave as follows: " . . . with indolence, passivity, unwillingness to accept responsibility, resistance to change, willingness to follow the demagogue, unreasonable demands for economic benefits. "1

The new era will bring an increased capability to the traditional leadership role. This should cause us to reevaluate our concepts of this role. Argyris suggests that:

Following the logic of specialization the planners create a new function (leadership) whose primary responsibility shall be the control, direction, and coordination of the interrelationships of the parts and to make certain that each part performs towards objective, adequately. . . . The impact of such a state of affairs is to make the individuals dependent upon, passive toward, and subordinate to the leader. As a result the individuals have little control over their working environment. Concomitantly, their time perspective is shortened because they do not control the information necessary to predict their future. . . . These requirements of formal organization act to inhibit four of the growth trends of the personality: adults who are passive and subordinate, and who have little control and time perspective, exemplifying dimensions of immaturity, not adulthood.²

In the Marine Corps, where there has always been this specialization, leadership is a function of critical importance. In the environment of combat, where life and death are at stake, it is imperative to have the unquestioned authority to control, direct and coordinate. Yet the Marine Corps cannot afford to foster the characteristics listed above. It has purposely and with great effort worked against them in the past. Dependency, passive-

¹Ibid., p. 42.

²Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization (New York: Harper Brothers, 1957), pp. 60-61.

ness and indifference are anathema to the objectives of the Marine Corps. Yet it is in danger of fostering them in the years ahead by the imposition of greatly tightened control systems. In the name of efficiency it may promote ineffectiveness. There is special need to be alert to this problem because it is difficult to demonstrate in a cause-effect relationship. That is, it is hard to prove that the characteristics Argyris suggests will be produced by tightened "leadership" controls. This is in marked contrast with how clearly we can see the direct beneficial effects of tightened control within our military organizational structures. As Likert notes:

The measurement of such end-result variables as production, costs, etc. combined with skillful use of scientific management and related principles and procedures, provides a body of evidence showing that tighter job organization and tighter budgetary and other controls yield improved results. . . . More companies are extending and increasing the use of performance measurements and indexes, measured day work, and similar developments. Comparable trends are also occurring in the use of budgets and budgetary controls, with the decisions on budgets often highly centralized. Accompanying these developments are a feeling of increased hierarchical pressure and a growing resentment against it. . . . Until the intervening variables such as perceptions, attitudes, expectations, motivations, and the effectiveness of communications are regularly measured and analyzed, the companies using the job-organization system will have no data and little evidence to cause them to question the soundness of the management system which they are now using. . . .¹

This point seems especially appropriate for the military where today we hear constantly of resentment against increasing budgetary and other hierarchical pressures. These pressures represent efficiency. No organization can or should stand in the

¹Likert, p. 84.

way of efficiency unless it can demonstrate some greater harm that it creates. Argyris has suggested above what that harm is. This threat is not new to the Marine Corps. In the past the potential existed within its organizational structure to foster the types of characteristics that he describes. But, in the past, the inability of the commander and staff to make the system work as rigidly as designed has limited the fostering of these effects. In addition, the Marine Corps has always made positive efforts to stress the development of initiative, aggressiveness and planning. These acted in opposition to the development of characteristics such as dependence, passivity, and shortened perspective that the system has the potential to generate.

While this has been done in the past through intuition and wisdom gained from experience, it must be done in the future because of explicit perception of the principles involved. This is because the need to counteract such forces will be much greater in the years ahead. The problem dimension has been radically altered by the increase in the capacity for control of subordinates by superior brought about by the revolutionary change in information technology.

Efforts in the past have been made primarily at the people level. The Marine Corps has stressed the importance and capabilities of the individual both by himself and as a member of the team. It spends a great deal of time in leadership training programs for the development of characteristics needed in the crisis of battle. It must redouble its efforts in this direction in the future through traditional and proven techniques.

However, it should also give attention to the other dimensions of organizational change that Leavitt suggests. It is important how the Marine Corps uses information technology within its organization. Further, it should examine its organizational structures themselves to test their validity in the new era. The next chapter outlines courses of action that will assist in meeting these needs.

CHAPTER V

MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

The Level of Data Use

The main purpose of Chapter IV was to attempt to portray the problems of information technology. A solution is tremendously more complex. An increased use of traditional solutions was suggested as part of the answer. A second source of assistance can come from increased attention to the level at which data collected is used. This has a direct bearing on organizational structure and functioning.

There is a subtle pitfall to be aware of in setting the level at which the data collected is used. This is the area in which Headquarters, Marine Corps can be most effective. The Commandant may, seemingly in keeping with sound participative and delegation principles, set policy and ostensibly leave the decision-making to his line subordinates. However, the Commandant can then, either knowingly or unknowingly, proceed to use his staff to exercise the control and close supervision over subordinate functioning that he purports to avoid. This comes about when the Commandant, aware of his unassailable right to know what is going on, uses his staff to gather information. With their greatly increased capability to gather data a sort of "data collection supervision" process will increasingly come into being. McGregor portrays this rationale as follows:

He can delegate and yet keep control. He need not rely on authority in the directive sense if he can assign to someone else the responsibility: 1. for making sure his subordinates stay within policy limits and 2. for collecting and providing him with data which will enable him to know what is happening in time to step in before serious trouble arises. . . .

He directs by means of policy; the decisions are made at the point of action; his subordinates have the freedom to make mistakes. There is no risk involved because he has a group of staff specialists who keep a detailed eye on every important aspect of the operations. He can concern himself with major problems. . . . Things are "under control." If anything is not as it should be, either the staff will see that it is corrected or notify him so that he can take care of it before serious difficulties arise.

A nice situation- or a travesty? It depends on your theoretical assumptions. . . . The staff have now become policemen, exercising by proxy the direct authority which was "relinquished" by the line. . . . Ingenious methods for defeating staff control will be developed, and the staff will be kept busy developing new ones to compensate for these. Antagonisms between line and staff will prevent the kind of collaboration that is essential for achieving organizational objectives.¹

The information collected with the new capability should be for the use of the appropriate level, not for closer control and supervision of lower levels by higher levels.

With respect to data and reports compiled by staff groups, the principle of self-control requires that they be provided to each member of management for controlling his own, not his subordinates' job. . . . Every manager is entitled to all the detailed data he wishes for purposes of self-control. If, however, the data are broken down in a fashion which reveals the day-to-day performance of individual subordinates, they are no longer data for self-control. His use of such information vitiates the idea of delegation completely. (The same thing is true, of course, if he assigns to staff the responsibility of "controlling" his subordinates by this means.) . . .

If such summary data indicates to the manager that something is wrong within the organizational unit for which he is responsible, he will turn not to staff, but to his subordinates for help in analyzing the problem and correcting it. He will not assign staff "policemen" the task of

¹McGregor, pp. 148-150.

locating the "culprit." If his subordinates have data for controlling their own jobs, the likelihood is that they will already have spotted and either corrected the difficulty themselves or sought help in doing so.¹

In the words of another author:

In a better data collection system, "information collected" on an individual will be collected "by" him and evaluated by him, and he will take the appropriate action. . . . Under these conditions, it is hoped that the information will not tend to be perceived as communicating whether or not a person has failed or succeeded but as information on how he is doing.²

The increased ability to collect data can then, with the proper organizational climate, become an aid to the subordinate. The burden is on the Commander at every level to use at his level the appropriate data and to provide the subordinate with the data appropriate to his lower level. It is when the commander, either personally or through his staff, uses this data as a corrective, directive device that it becomes a threat to the subordinate.

A simplified expression of this concept would be to attempt to ensure that the feedback principle be applied to every level of the command structure. This involves taking positive steps to combat the tendency towards centralization of the command function. Higher levels could monitor subordinates but at the same time avoid functioning in the traditional data-gathering, edict-issuing manner. The computer combined with improved communications gives us a tremendous monitoring potential. This

¹McGregor, p. 161.

²Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 276.

must be used with restraint for, as McGregor suggests, monitoring can be used as destructively as more traditional directive controls. Put in another way, authority is more a circular than a hierarchical process.¹ Authority gained by insertion into the circular information flow is a license for power. How much the license is used and how the power gained is used will determine the effects produced.

These principles are equally applicable to the Commandant and to Marine commanders at every level. However, the leadership in the proper use of information must come from the top. If it does not then it will be extremely difficult for subordinate commanders to take the right approach. Without support from the top and recognition that errors will be made subordinates will not be willing to risk the opportunities for error such a system provides their subordinates. Commanders at every level must accept the fact that if data is not to be used at the highest level there will be resultant mistakes that they very possibly could have avoided. However, they must also realize that:

Administrative science is concerned with efficient and effective accomplishment of organization goals. However, the efficiency criterion must be tempered, for the most efficient accomplishment of objectives might conflict with the most judicious and intelligent use of the human resource.²

¹Reis, pp. 25-28.

²Rocco Carzo, Jr., "Administrative Science and the Role of Value Judgments," Current Issues and Emerging Concepts in Management, ed. Paul M. Dauten (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p. 66.

Changes in Staff Organization

In addition to considering how the technology is used in an organization, the organizational structure itself should be studied to understand its relationship to the new technology. This last section of this chapter deals with the effects of information technology on the general staff structure and the role of the staff. It suggests ways to structure organizations to better meet the challenge of data systems.

It was stated in Chapter II that a real general staff concept includes the performance by the staff of supervision in functional areas as assistance to the commander. It thus represents a level of authority between the commander and his subordinates. Many would argue that the general staff has no command authority but, as Reis notes, while

. . . all orders, even those involving minute details to lower echelons, are given in the name of the commander . . . at the same time, . . . the fiction that the staff officer does not command does not alter the fact that he not only plans and issues orders, but he also directs the details of execution, insofar as the commander permits. . . . In order to preserve unity of command and hierarchical configuration, subordinates must report to only one superior and all lines of authority must converge on one man at the top. But at the same time, staff officers are to have real responsibility for their assigned functional areas. And in order to implement their responsibility they must have authority.¹

In the past the commander has really had no option but to permit the staff to assume the use of some of his authority. In the future computers may be granted similar authority. The use

¹Reis, pp. 22-23, 159.

of computers as integral parts of management systems will require a formalization of command standards. These standards can and will then be applied to the management of units by the computer. The computer will do this through a programmed analysis. It will submit data collected to this analysis and detect exceptions to the criteria it is provided. It will then indicate either the exception or the required action appropriate to such exceptions. Hopefully, the commander will personally establish most of these criteria and required courses of action. Perhaps many will be forced upon him by his superiors. In any case, the computer will be applying standards set by someone at some level.

This is exactly what the general staff has done in the past in its extension of the commander role. It collected data, applied standards (either the formalized or unformalized standards of the commander or those of the staff officer himself) and detected exceptions. The exceptions were then acted upon by the commander, or the general staff officer in his name. Since the computer will do this we have eliminated a basic need for the general staff and lessened the need for staff supervision in general.

If, in keeping with this, we make a positive effort to reduce the supervisory, decision-making function of staffs and ultimately eliminate the general staff, the work load of the commander may increase despite the computer's help. However, he would not be inundated as he would have been in the past without the general staff. The computer will ensure that he will deal with only the decision-making problems identified by the

exceptions, not with the sea of detail that has made the general staff necessary.

Such a reduction in staff would probably result in some increase in the commander's exposure to details. The volume of work that this entails is traditionally posed as a matter involving great effort and little benefit to the commander. However, as Neustadt notes,

Presidents are always being told that they should leave details to others. It is dubious advice. Exposure to details of operations and policy provides the frame of reference for details of information.¹

The development of this frame of reference is critical to the role of every commander.

Even if we eliminate entirely the general staff, the commander will still need the special staff. We noted that the coordination of the special staff was a secondary way in which the general staff assisted the commander. Elimination of the general staff will require the commander to deal directly with a proliferation of special staff officers.

As was seen earlier, one of the characteristics of the special staff was a great diversity of function. Another characteristic was a high degree of specialization. Gerald G. Fisch challenges our traditional span of control concepts that limits the number of people a commander can supervise to a half dozen. He points out that when there is a high degree of diversity the commander is generally dealing with people who have very specialized training and these people are dealt with on a "go" - "no go"

¹Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 154.

basis. There is little supervision or training that can be done by the commander. Under these circumstances the span of control is greatly increased. This is not true in the commander's dealings with subordinate commanders since in that relationship there is more supervision and subordinate training.¹

The planning function of the general staff will also not disappear when the general staff is gone. However, computer programs will be developed to handle many present planning tasks. Another solution to this problem is to create a special staff function for planning. This has been a natural and repeated evolution in the past- at Headquarters, Marine Corps it started with the War Plans Section in the Division of Plans and Policies and has risen to the level of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs. Each Special Staff member has the capability of planning pertaining to his functional area. A new "special" staff member concerned solely with the coordination of plans could handle this subdivision of the present G-3 function.

We saw that the general staff also assisted the commander through advice. The advice of a technical nature could best come directly from these special staff officers. We already can see the increasing recognition of this in the rising number of special staff officers. As Mary P. Follet prophesied in 1926,

. . . management is becoming more and more specialized; the policies and methods of a department rest on that department's special body of knowledge, and there is a tendency for the responsibility to be borne by those

¹Gerald G. Fisch, "Stretching the Span of Management," Harvard Business Review, (Sept.-Oct., 1963), p. 74.

with that special body of knowledge rather than by a man at the top because of his official position.¹

This concept also offers us an important key to lessening resentment of the subordinate commanders to "staffs." By eliminating the general staff we remove the general staff hierarchical position as the source of special staff authority. The isolation of special staff sections would of itself decrease the supervisory aura currently associated with such sections. Any power they are able to generate would have to come in larger part from the quality of the service they render.

The direct intercourse of the commander with his special staff has another advantage. Each level between the commander and those directly involved with specific problems represents a filter for information. Each such level acts on information in passing it along. Judgments are made in the process of reducing information for transmittal. As a result each subsequent level takes the judgments of lower levels and perceives them as facts. March and Simon refer to this process as "uncertainty absorption."² By getting closer to the parties directly involved, the commander can reduce this effect. This applies to operational subordinates as well as to special staff officers. This concept is closely allied to the problem mentioned above concerning the lack of work

¹Mary P. Follett, "The Illusion of Final Authority," a paper presented before the Taylor Society in New York, Dec. 10, 1926.

²Uncertainty absorption takes place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and the inferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then communicated. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 165.

satisfaction experienced by staff members at Headquarters working under the separation of plans and policies from execution. The more the staff hierarchy that surrounds and lies between the operator and the decision-maker, the poorer the quality of the information the decision-maker will receive and the less satisfaction his staff will find in their work.

The aim of Chapters IV and V has been to portray an issue that has a new dimension in our era and that is of major importance to the Marine Corps. The types of consideration portrayed here are less obvious than some of the other reasons why the Commandant should be vitally concerned with information processes today. There has been a great deal of attention given to the cost of information in command and control systems. It has been estimated at ten percent of the Department of Defense expenditure.¹ However, the issues portrayed in these chapters cannot be expressed in dollar terms. It can only be said that they represent values that are priceless in combat.

¹(Editors' Preface), Military Information Systems, ed. Edward Bennett, James Degan, Joseph Spiegel (New York: Frederick A. Praegar, 1964), p. v.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The Staff Personnel Problem

During informal conversations with those who staff Headquarters, Marine Corps, one constantly encounters the problem of inadequate previous training of personnel in the functional area to which they are assigned. It seems evident that the traditional conflict of the staff specialist versus the line officer needs increased attention if the Marine Corps is to adequately staff its Headquarters. An officer corps so limited in size cannot adequately support separate staff corps. The detail system, properly performed, seems an appropriate solution for meeting the Marine Corps staffing needs. However, for the detail system to effectively meet staffing needs there must be planned, repeated assignments of officers to the same functional area. This process should be accompanied by appropriate schooling in this staff specialty. Basic to making such a system effective is the requirement that those who have responsibility for assigning officer personnel recognize and accept this goal. This also means that the immediate whims or needs of the commander will sometimes be tempered by the need for developing staff specialists. The Combs Board ¹ recently recommended a program of repeated assign-

¹Report of a Board to Study Billet Requirements and Grade Distribution in the Subspecialty and Specialty areas in the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, dated December, 1964.

ments to a secondary career development field for Naval officers. If the Navy with its staff corps feels this program is necessary for it to properly fill staff billets, how much more so must it be necessary for the Marine Corps where line officers carry almost the entire staffing load? In summary, there is evidence, within the Marine Corps and without, that the complexity of senior staff billets has increased to the point where the old approach to detailing has become simply inadequate.

Information Technology

The advent of information technology outlined in chapters IV and V presents a problem area of major proportions for the Commandant. The need for someone concerned with this problem to be placed well up in the organizational hierarchy has been described as follows:

There must be someone in tomorrow's complex organization who is in charge of all aspects of information generating, processing, and dissemination. It must be his responsibility to determine how management's information needs can best be met. Furthermore, he must have the intellectual capacity to know what types of analysis performed on various data will produce information of value to the company.¹

The need has already been met at the highest level in the other services. In the Navy there is a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy who heads the Office of Management Information Systems. The Army has an Information and Data Systems Office whose head is a special assistant to the Chief of Staff and who

¹Gerald G. Fisch, "Stretching the Span of Management," Harvard Business Review, (Sept.-Oct., 1963), p. 13.

reports to the Vice-Chief of Staff. In the Air Force this function is directly under the Comptroller, who is assigned a department-wide management information responsibility.

The Marine Corps approach is in marked contrast with this. Until the recent creation of the Office of the Assistant Director for Management Systems Development within the Data Systems Division, this responsibility was assigned to the Management Engineering Branch of the Administrative Division. The mission of this branch is:

To provide technical assistance and analytical services pursuant to the formulation, development, implementation, and improvement of management systems, methods, procedures and techniques.¹

Among its assigned functions is the following:

Serves as a research center to develop and evaluate new management concepts and techniques.²

Although the Management Engineering Branch had (and has) this assigned mission and function, it has been located at a level where such over-all responsibility cannot be accomplished. This inadequacy led to the creation of a new agency, the Office of the Assistant Director for Data Systems Development because the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) recognized that the need in the area of management and management information systems was not being met. This present solution to the problem of information systems contains two serious defects:

¹Headquarters Order P5000.3A, Change 2 , dated 18 Dec., 1964, Para. 10150.1

²Ibid., para. 10150.2m.

1. A duplication of mission has been created. The new office has a mission that is well within that already assigned to the Management Engineering Branch.

2. The need is still met at too low a level within the organization. The new Office of Management Systems Development may have a greater chance of success, since its sponsor is a Deputy Chief of Staff. If it does succeed it will be in spite of the fact that the office itself is submerged within a lower division.

Organization

There is a need for the elimination of the duplication of effort, the confusion of responsibility, and the compounding of people who report to the Chief of Staff. The most obvious areas of overlap are those of the G-1 with the Personnel Department and the G-4 with the Supply Department. The elimination of this duplication has repeatedly been recommended by organizational studies and is overdue.¹ There is also a major area of overlap between the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) and the responsibilities of the G-3.

In addition to these practical aspects, the whole subject of staff organization and functioning should be studied. In the years ahead the use of data systems and automated quantitative analysis techniques will have a strong influence on command struc-

¹The most recent such recommendation was made in the Report of the Headquarters, Marine Corps Reorganization Board dated August 1961 (the Pepper Board). It recommended a consolidation of functional responsibilities under a directorate system.

tures. These techniques cause changes in the functioning of organizations at every level. How the Marine Corps organizes to meet these changes will determine the effects that will be produced. The changes in information processes are revolutionary. The reactions that these changes require in organization will be of the same dimension.

Summary

A good portion of the present organizational problems of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps can be attributed to the aborted installation of the general staff in 1952. Much of the remaining portion is due to inadequate application of management principles in the solution of problems brought about by changing times. To be able to command is not the same as to be able to give effective administrative direction. The lack of a strong management office within Headquarters suggests that this distinction is not recognized. In all the history of changes in the organization of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps the brightest spot is the realignment brought about by the Navy Department Management Engineer in 1943. (See Chapter I). Perhaps, after twenty two years, Headquarters is due to have the professionals take another look. The changes that can be forecast in the years ahead due to information technology make the need for attention to the area of organization and management one of paramount urgency.

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